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Giancarlo Marchetti, La contingenza dei fatti e l’oggettività dei valori, Milano – 
Udine: Mimesis, 2013, 216 p. 
Giancarlo Marchetti’s La contingenza dei fatti e l’oggettività dei valori is a 
collection of nine essays concerning the fact–value debate. Among the authors, we 
find some of the most important protagonists of contemporary philosophy, including 
Donald Davidson and Hilary Putnam, to whom we probably owe the renaissance of 
the issue discussed in Marchetti’s volume. 
Undoubtedly, Putnam’s 2002 book The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy 
(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England 2002) 
has played a crucial role in bringing back philosophical attention to this problem, 
originated from the well-known Humean ban: “no ought from is”. Even if Hume’s point 
was far more nuanced, its reception through the medium of neopositivism gave birth 
to the mainstream postulate according to which facts and values should be drastically 
separated, in order to avoid both conceptual and ethical misunderstandings. However, 
from the early decades of the 20th century, an increasing number of authors have 
challenged this apparently hegemonic point of view, proposing an anti-dichotomic 
approach whose history and contemporary outcomes are thoroughly presented in La 
contingenza dei fatti e l’oggettività dei valori.
Starting from the historical side, a great credit is given to John Dewey’s pivotal 
role in challenging the dichotomic pensée unique. Hilary Putnam (Chapter 2), Vivian 
Walsh (Chapter 3) and Ruth Anna Putnam (Chapter 6) show how Dewey’s reflections 
about evaluation have opened a field of inquiry in which both the objectivity of values 
and the impossibility of conceiving facts outside a normative framework can be 
consistently stated. This perspective, which represents a serious alternative to logical 
positivist dichotomic approaches, claims to recognize the objective status of evaluations 
not from a humanistic, anti-scientific point of view, but rather from a naturalistic 
standpoint. Human conduct cannot deal with facts out of a normative framework, and 
at the same time cannot refer to values without taking facts into account. Specifically, 
Putnam’s essay shows clearly the four theoretical stances by means of which Dewey 
escapes the double grip of cognitivist internalism (e.g. utilitarianism) and of non-
cognitivist internalism (e.g. emotivism): the centrality of reflection in the constitution 
of values (42); the objective nature of values (53-54); the intersubjective nature of 
values (48-49), and finally the definition of the discussion about values as a particular 
instance of practical discussion (57). Being irreducible neither to unsophisticated 
scientism, nor to ultra-subjectivist forms of postmodernism, Dewey’s point seems 
to offer an original contribution to the contemporary need for a philosophical “third 
way” between the two more commonly used instances of dogmatism. 
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 Even when this Deweyan heritage can’t be directly tracked, we can often find 
some interesting concurrences. For instance, Taylor’s distinction between initial 
conception of the good and considered conception of the good (Chapter  8), wherein 
the presence of reflection distinguishes the latter from the former, is logically 
analogous to Deweyan conceptual couples like praise/appraise, valuing/evaluating. 
And, in the same essay, we can read the following sentence, which seems to perfectly 
reflect Dewey’s meliorism: “Moral conflict is often a mere way station on the path 
toward more encompassing normative community” (190-191). Also David Copp’s 
naturalistic outline of a society-centered moral (Chapter  7) seems to reflect the 
philosophical approach to morality proposed by Mead and Dewey in the writings 
from their years in Chicago. Thus, either directly or indirectly, Marchetti’s collection 
pinpoints classical pragmatism as a most fertile source of arguments in favor of an 
anti-dichotomic approach to the fact-value question. 
Undoubtedly, the scope of La contingenza dei fatti e l’oggettività dei valori 
goes far beyond the domain of history of philosophy. In fact, the central issues of 
the volume are often dealt with in an analytical fashion. From this logical point of 
view, it is interesting to notice that the most powerful argument against the evaluation/
description dichotomy may consist in the detailed presentation of the unbearable 
difficulties entailed by the position under discussion. Even if their arguments 
are formulated in a hypothetical form, both Barry Stroud and Donald Davidson 
(see Chapter 9 and Chapter 4, respectively) invite the reader to acknowledge the 
difficulties involved in denying the objective nature of valuations in a consistent way 
without rendering some crucial and irrevocable concepts like “intentional action” and 
“understanding” unintelligible. As Stroud argues, it is impossible to talk appropriately 
about intentional actions without referring to reasons to act; but “reasons” in turn 
presuppose evaluations. For instance, the reason why a man goes to work on a sunny 
Summer day instead of going to the beach is grounded on an evaluation: he evaluates 
that keeping his job is actually the most important thing to him. As long as it can 
be reasonably upheld, this evaluation is not a mere emotional expression. Therefore, 
reasons to act have both an evaluative and an objective nature. In an equally persuasive 
way, Davidson explains how impossible it is to conceive the act of understanding 
outside a normative framework, and how this common ground is the precondition, 
rather than the consequence of public discussion, no matter how conflicting it might be. 
 Besides the more theoretical and analytical discussions, the book contains several 
original insights concerning particular issues. Kenneth Taylor’s essay in Chapter  8 
shows how a relativistic approach may be perfectly consistent with an objective 
definition of values. In order to achieve this apparently counterintuitive theoretical 
result, Taylor argues, we must separate tolerant relativism from intolerant relativism. 
Differently from the former, the latter allows for the possibility of criticizing a different 
moral system, and at the same time it is consistent with the rejection of a transcendent 
ethical standpoint (195). Based on the distinction between the authority that entitles 
and the authority that binds, an intolerant relativist can morally reject values employed 
by a different culture (e.g. female genital mutilation), without parting with relativism. 
Also Sharyn Clough’s essay (Chapter 5) is a bold challenge to many philosophical 
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stereotypes. Against banal interpretations of feminist epistemologies as instances of 
a mere destructive refusal of scientific enterprise in itself, Clough demonstrates that 
feminist evaluative points of view in science often prove to be more objective than 
their chauvinist predecessors, as long as they are able to produce more satisfying and 
reliable scientific results. For example, the advent of a feminist radical reshaping of 
the mainstream sociological conception of women, which constricted the domain of 
their needs and desires to matrimonial and parental relationships, has made possible 
an objective empirical improvement in scientific research on divorce (114). So 
therefore, the shift from dichotomic to anti-dichotomic approaches to the fact-value 
issue appears as a valuable source of new conceptual reconstructions and of some 
deep theoretical innovations.
To sum up, this volume is interesting reading for any scholar interested in philosophy 
and in natural and social sciences. Starting from Marchetti’s essay in Chapter I – an 
admirable reconstruction of the history of the fact/value dichotomy from Hume to 
Putnam, which sheds light on often underrated authors like Charles L. Stevenson, and 
also provides a thorough bibliography of the general subject-matter – , both the novice 
and the expert reader may find an exhaustive exposition of the contemporary state of 
debate concerning the issue in question. Under this aspect, the scope of this collection 
seems to partly overlap with the purposes of other recent volumes – among them, 
I would like to mention the interesting books Value–Free Science: Ideals and Illusions, 
edited by Harold Kincaid, John Dupré, and Alison Wylie in 2007, and M. Krausz, 
Relativism: a Contemporary Anthology (2010). However, Marchetti’s volume is not 
just a competently assembled overview, but rather an original and important work for 
a number of reasons.
Apart from its geo-political context – Marchetti’s volume is the first anthology 
examining the fact/value debate in Italian – what really makes La contingenza dei fatti 
e l’oggettività dei valori a must-read and a very original contribution to contemporary 
philosophical debate is the above mentioned link which connects, either directly or 
indirectly, the main arguments displayed through the nine essays composing the book 
with the pragmatist heritage. This legacy is often neglected and underrated, but it 
has become a necessary benchmark in contemporary philosophical and scientific 
discussions. Even though both the “objectivity of values” and the “contingency of 
facts” are now endorsed by several scholars belonging to various schools of thought, 
pragmatism has played a crucial role in moving towards the dismissal of the fact/
value dichotomy. This dismissal leads both to the acknowledgment of the objective 
nature of moral statements, evaluations, and discussions, and to the recognition of the 
necessary presence of values in the scientific enterprise. The two paths are beyond 
doubt covered in an original and up-to-date way by Marchetti’s volume, which 
presents itself not as a simple hommage to pragmatism, but rather as a living proof of 
the vitality of the pragmatist intuitions and ideas. 
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